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Abstract—Mutli-domain monitoring aims at guaranteeing
QoS for services crossing several domains. It is often desirable
to perform global monitoring to guarantee end-to-end QoS
for services across domains and to reduce the monitoring
cost. However, global monitoring might be infeasible due to
confidentiality constraints. The alternative solution is to perform
per-domain monitoring.
In this work, we propose to evaluate global and per-domain
monitoring techniques. For this end, we study the properties of
multi-domain networks and the requirements of multi-domain
monitoring. We formulate the problem as an Integer Linear
Program (ILP). We show that it is a Nondeterministic Polynomial
Time Hard (NP-Hard) problem, and therefore, we devise a
heuristic that meets multi-domain properties. We show that
confidentiality is far from being the only constraint to global
multi-domain monitoring. In our evaluation, the confidentiality
constraint has been relaxed, in order to investigate other per-
formance metrics; namely, the monitoring cost, the quality of
monitored paths, the anomaly detection delays, and the fairness
of monitoring load distribution among domains. Simulation
results on random topologies show that per-domain monitoring
outperforms global monitoring for all these metrics, except the
monitoring cost that is slightly lower for global monitoring.
I. INTRODUCTION
Link-level anomaly monitoring is a means to detect and
localize anomalies on links that occur due to physical failures,
network congestion and security attacks. It evaluates the delays
and loss rates on links and their available bandwidth capacities,
in order to guarantee the QoS requirements for services cross-
ing the network. Most existing studies on link-level network
monitoring have focused on mono-domain networks (e.g. [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8]). However, usually, services cross multiple
domains that belong to different administrative authorities, and
that are likely to have conflict of interests. This raises some
confidentiality problems that constrain the monitoring task.
Namely, most proposed monitoring schemes, which assume
a detailed knowledge of the network topology, cannot be
applied on multi-domain networks. This is because domains
are usually not willing to disclose detailed information of their
network topology and available resources.
In this paper, we focus on the problem of diagnosing
link-level anomalies in multi-domain networks. This includes
locating monitors and selecting monitoring paths than can
cover all the links. Our goal is to come up with a monitoring
This work has been supported by Alcatel-Lucent labs France, under the
grant n. 09CT310-01
scheme that overcomes confidentiality limitations. To this end,
we investigate the problem along two axes. The first axis
ignores confidentiality constraints and considers the multi-
domain network as a single domain. This is the global mon-
itoring technique. The second axis overcomes confidentiality
considerations by minimizing the information that is to be
exchanged between domains. Each domain monitors its intra-
domain links independently from the other domains, i.e. with-
out disclosing any information of its intra-domain topology.
Neighboring domains exchange only the set of their border
nodes that are candidate to hold monitoring devices, in order to
compute monitor locations and paths that can cover the inter-
domain links connecting them. This is the per-domain moni-
toring technique. Practically, the global monitoring technique
might be infeasible. However, a comparative study of these
two monitoring techniques aims at finding out and evaluating
all the constraints, other than confidentiality, that the multi-
domain monitoring must comply to.
The problem of monitor location and anomaly detection
has gained great interest over the few last years. The shared
goal of all these works is to minimize the monitoring cost,
that is the cost of locating monitoring devices and the cost
of injecting monitoring flows along monitoring paths. In this
work, we adopt the monitoring scheme proposed in [1][2] that
has been proven to achieve a smooth trade-off between monitor
location cost and anomaly detection cost by minimizing the
two costs jointly. The main challenge is to adapt the proposed
solutions to multi-domain networks with respect to topology
characteristics. We provide a mathematical formulation of the
problem, and we show that it is NP-Hard. Therefore, we
devise a heuristic solution that takes into considerations the
characteristics and the limitations of multi-domain network
topology.
The proposed heuristic is used by the global monitoring
technique and the per-domain technique. Besides the compu-
tation time and the monitoring cost, we consider new criteria to
evaluate the two monitoring techniques. These criteria emerge
from the characteristics of multi-domain networks and impact
the monitoring performance. First multi-domain networks are
large networks. Therefore, the global monitoring technique
that considers the multi-domain network as a single domain
is likely to monitor long paths that cross multiple domains.
This would result in large detection delays. Indeed, the longer
the monitored paths are, the larger the anomaly detection
delays are. Furthermore, long monitoring paths result in large
number of suspect links in case of failure. This is because all
the links of a monitoring path that exhibits an anomaly are
suspect to be anomalous. Second, multi-domain networks are
composed of domains that belong to different administrative
and economic authorities. Therefore, the monitoring solution
should distribute the monitoring load among domains fairly.
Otherwise, the most overloaded domains would not be willing
to collaborate.
We show through simulations that confidentiality is not the
only limitation to global multi-domain monitoring. Indeed,
results show that this monitoring technique delivers solutions
with relatively long monitored paths and does not guarantee a
fair distribution of monitoring load among domains. Besides,
the computation time for the global monitoring technique is
drastically high compared to the computation time for the
per-domain monitoring technique. In contrast, the difference
of costs of the solutions delivered by the two monitoring
techniques, in terms of number of monitors and redundant
measurements of links, is tiny. This is due to the characteristics
of multi-domain topology that will be discussed throughout
this paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Network Model
We can model a multi-domain network composed of M
connected domains as a set of undirected graphs Gi =
(Vi; Li); i = 1; 2; :::;M . Vi is the set of nodes of domain
i. It is composed of two sets: V interi and V
intra
i . V
inter
i
represents the set of border nodes that connect domain i to
its neighboring domains, and V intrai represents the set of core
nodes. Similarly, the set of links Li is composed of two sets:
Lintrai and L
inter
i . L
intra
i represents the set of intra-domain
links that connect the core nodes, and Linteri represents the
set of inter-domain links that connect nodes of V interi to
the border nodes of neighboring domains. We denote by Pi,
i = 1; 2; :::;M the set of intra-domain paths of domain i. A
path p 2 P is a set of undirected intra-domain links. We denote
by P inter the set of inter-domain paths of the multi-domain
network. A path pinter 2 P inter includes at least one inter-
domain link. We refer to Gintrai = (Vi; L
intra
i ) as the intra-
domain graph of domain i. Let Nd = f(i, j); i, j = 1; 2; :::;M ; i
and j are neighbor domainsg be the set of neighbor domains.
We refer to G(i;j) = (Vi;j ; Li;i) as the graph of the inter-
domain topology connecting domain i to domain j. Vi;j is the
set of border nodes of domains i and j that are connected to
each other, and Li;j is the set of inter-domain links connecting
domain i to domain j.
B. Problem Definition
This work addresses the problem of monitor location and
network anomaly detection in multi-domain networks. For
mono-domain networks, minimizing the cost of monitor lo-
cation and network anomaly detection consists in deploying
as few monitors as possible and avoiding redundant measure-
ments of links, i.e. avoiding overlaps among monitoring paths.
These two minimization objectives are conflictual. It turned
out that a joint optimization of monitor location and anomaly
detection costs balances efficiently the trade-off and reduces
the two costs [1]. However the problem is NP-Hard. Heuristics
have been proposed for mono-domain networks in [2]. For
multi-domain networks, the problem can be formulated as
follows. We want to deploy monitors and select monitoring
paths between the deployed monitors. The aim is to cover all
the inter-domain and the intra-domain links, while reducing
the number of deployed monitors and avoiding redundant
measurements.
Until now, multi-domain monitoring seems to be similar to
mono-domain monitoring. However, there are some constraints
to multi-domain monitoring that stem from the characteristics
of multi-domain networks. The first constraint is related to the
structure of multi-domain networks. A multi-domain network
is a set of domains that belong to different administrative
authorities. Due to economic and security considerations,
domains are usually not willing to share detailed informa-
tion of their network topologies and resources. This is a
blocking constraint to the global monitoring technique. This
technique assumes the existence of a central entity that has
a detailed knowledge of the intra-domain topologies of all
the domains composing the multi-domain network as well as
the inter-domain topologies connecting neighboring domains.
An alternative solution would be to let each domain cover its
intra-domain links using intra-domain paths only. Neighboring
domains collaborate to cover inter-domain links connecting
them. This is the per-domain technique.
At first glance, when the global topology is known, we tend
to assert that the global monitoring technique outperforms the
per-domain monitoring technique. This is because, considering
only the metrics of number of monitors and number of redun-
dant measurements of links, all the solutions of the per-domain
monitoring technique are feasible solutions of the global
monitoring technique. We illustrate our assertion in Fig. 1. and
Fig. 2. Hereby, we consider a multi-domain network composed
of two domains connected by a single inter-domain link (3; 5).
We assume that the cost of deploying a monitor equals the
cost of a redundant measurement, i.e. the cost of measuring
a link that is already measured. Grey nodes hold monitoring
devices. The black thick lines draw the monitored paths. Fig.
1. depicts a minimal per-domain monitoring solution, whereas
Fig. 2. depicts a minimal global monitoring solution. We notice
that the per-domain solution deploys 4 monitors, against 2
monitors and 1 redundant measurement for the global solution.
The global monitoring technique succeeded to reduce the
monitoring cost by removing monitors that are deployed on
the border nodes of each domain.
The question that arises here is the following: how worse
is the performance of the per-domain technique compared to
the global monitoring technique ? To answer this question,
we investigate the quality of the global monitoring solutions.
Reducing the number of monitors results in longer monitoring
paths. The figures above validate this claim. Nonetheless,
Fig. 1. Per-domain Monitoring Solution Fig. 2. Global Monitoring Solution
multi-domain networks are usually very large networks. Sub-
sequently, the global monitoring technique is likely to select
very long monitoring paths. This is the second constraint to
global monitoring; because the longer the monitored paths are,
the larger the anomaly detection delays are and the larger
the number of suspect links in case an anomaly occurs is.
Furthermore, when domains accept to collaborate to perform
global monitoring, they expect to achieve individual benefits
in return. This means that the monitoring solution should
distribute the monitoring load among the participating domains
evenly. Therefore, besides the monitoring cost, the quality
of monitoring paths and the fairness of monitoring load
distribution must be considered in the evaluation of the two
monitoring techniques.
Based on this discussion, we claim that confidentiality is
so far not the only constraint to global monitoring, and that
per-domain monitoring might turn out to be more efficient
with respect to some metrics. We validate our claims in the
remainder of this paper.
C. Architecture and Cost Model of Multi-Domain Monitoring
Fig. 3. depicts a sample multi-domain monitoring architec-
ture, only nodes that hold monitoring devices are drawn. In
each domain there is a Network Operation Center, denoted
Domain NOC, that communicates with the monitors of the
domain, in order to collect monitoring information and manage
the monitoring task within the domain. A domain NOC has
a detailed knowledge of the domain topology and resources.
In addition, there is a central NOC that communicates with
all the Domain NOCs. It collects and analyzes monitoring
information collected within domains. This multi-domain ar-
chitecture matches the usual architecture proposed in most
works on multi-domain monitoring (e.g. [10], [11]). For global
monitoring, the central NOC has a detailed knowledge of
the topologies and the resources of all the domains; whereas
for per-domain monitoring, it does not participate in the
monitoring task.
We note that monitor location and anomaly detection means
deploying monitors in the network and selecting monitoring
paths that can cover all the network links in order to detect
potential link-level anomalies. In this work, we are not inter-
ested in the localization of anomalies.
Central NOC
Domain NOC
Domain NOC
Domain NOC
Domain NOC
Fig. 3. Sample Multi-domain Monitoring Architecture
TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED THROUGHOUT THE PAPER
Symbol Definition
Zp A binary variable that indicates whether path p
is selected to be monitored
Yni A binary variable that indicates whether node ni
is selected as a monitor location
Cni The cost of deploying a monitoring device on node n
Cli The cost of monitoring the intra-domain link li
Cl(i;j) The cost of monitoring the inter-domain link li;j
lip A binary parameter that indicates whether link li belongs
to path p
l(i;j)p A binary parameter that indicates whether the inter-domain
link l(i;j) belongs to path p
nip A binary parameter that indicates whether node ni is an
end node of path p
DRi(SP ) the detection ratio of path pi considering the set of selected
monitoring paths SP
CP The set of candidate monitoring paths
SP The set of selected monitoring paths
SM The set of selected monitors
A summary of the symbols used in the remainder of the paper
is depicted in TABLE I. The multi-domain monitoring cost
can be expressed as the sum of the following costs:
* Monitor location cost: it includes the effective cost of
deploying hardware and software monitoring devices and the
cost of their maintenance. In addition, it includes the cost
of communications between monitors and their corresponding
Domain NOC. For instance, the cost of communications be-
tween a monitor and the NOC can be expressed as a function
of the physical distance that separates them. Let us denote by
Cni the cost of deploying a monitor on node ni, the multi-
domain monitor location cost can be expressed as follows:X
i=1;2;:::;M; ni2Ni
CniYni (1)
* Anomaly detection cost: it expresses the overhead of
monitoring flows on the underlying network. Each link must
be monitored at least once. Redundant measurements of links
are considered as monitoring overhead. Let us denote by Cli
the cost of measuring link li. Cli must be proportional to the
load of link li, in order to avoid multiple measurements of
the most overloaded links of the network. The multi-domain
anomaly detection cost can be expressed as follows:
X
i=1;2;:::;M; li2Li; p2Pi[P inter
lipCliZp +X
(i;j)2Nd; l(i;j)2L(i;j); p2P inter
l(i;j)pCl(i;j)Zp
(2)
III. ILP FORMULATION
The monitoring solution aims at minimizing the monitor
location cost (1), and the anomaly detection cost (2). In our
previous works, we have demonstrated that there is an inter-
play between these two minimization objectives. However, it
turned out that the joint minimization of the two objectives
balances efficiently this interplay [1], [2]. Therefore, our ILP
formulation minimizes jointly the monitoring costs expressed
above. Let  and  be relative weights of the monitor
location cost and the anomaly detection cost, respectively. The
objective function reads as follows:
minimize: *(1) + *(2)
All the links of the multi-domain network, i.e. the intra-
domain and the inter-domain links, must be monitored at least
once. Practically, this means that each link must belong at least
to one monitored path. These link coverage constraints read
as follows: X
i=1;2;:::;M; p2Pi[P inter
lipZp  1;
8i = 1; 2; :::;M; 8li 2 Li
(3)X
p2P inter
l(i;j)pZp  1;
8(i; j) 2 Nd; 8 l(i;j) 2 L(i;j);
(4)
The end nodes of all the monitored paths must hold mon-
itoring devices. These monitor location constraints read as
follows:
Yni  nipZp;
8i = 1; 2; :::;M; 8ni 2 Ni; 8p 2 Pi [ P inter
(5)
The equivalent problem for mono-domain networks has
been shown to be NP-Hard [1]. The multi-domain monitoring
problem is reduced to the mono-domain monitoring problem,
introduced in [1], for Nd = ; and P inter = ;. We conclude
that the multi-domain monitoring problem is NP-Hard, and
thus, we propose a heuristic solution in the next section.
IV. HEURISTIC SOLUTION
The heuristic solution aims at minimizing the monitor
location cost and the anomaly detection cost jointly, thereby
balancing the trade-off between these two minimization ob-
jectives; while considering the properties and the limitations
of inter-domain networks.
Muli-domain networks are, usually, composed of dense
domains interconnected by few inter-domain links. Therefore,
the number of paths between two nodes belonging each to a
different domain, which is proportional to the number of inter-
domain links separating the two domains, is small compared
to the total number of paths. In [1], we have proposed a heuris-
tic for joint optimization of monitor location and anomaly
detection in mono-domain networks. This heuristic performs
an in-depth exploration of the network graph, in order to
find candidate monitoring paths between two given nodes. It
has been shown that this technique delivers good 1 candidate
monitoring paths in a short time [1]. However, when we ran
this heuristic on multi-domain networks and mono-domain
networks of the same size (i.e. the same number of links and
the same number of nodes), we noted that the computation
time of the multi-domain solution is drastically higher than the
computation time of the mono-domain solution. As expected,
this exponential increase of the computation time is due to
the computation time of candidate monitoring paths in multi-
domain networks. We consider the multi-domain network
depicted in Fig. 4. to illustrate our assertions.
The network is composed of two domains. The dotted links
are inter-domain links and the gray nodes hold monitoring
devices. The thick black line draws an inter-domain path that
starts from the monitor located in Domain 1, reaches domain 2
and then returns back to domain 1. The dotted thick line draws
an intra-domain path that starts from the monitor located in
Domain 1, crosses the two border nodes of Domain 1 (nodes
9 and 8), but do not reach Domain 2. We note that we avoid
looping paths, i.e. paths that cross the same nodes multiple
times. These are two examples of excluded paths: long paths
1We refer to the work in [1] for more details on the criteria and the com-
putation technique of candidate monitoring paths in mono-domain networks
Domain 1 Domain 2
Dotted links: inter-domain links
Grey nodes: hold monitoring devices
Thick lines: excluded candidate monitoring paths
Fig. 4. Illustrative multi-domain network
that do not end at a monitoring device and whose computation
time is long. It is the existence of such bad paths that makes
the computation time of inter-domain candidate monitoring
paths quite long, and therefore, the heuristic proposed in [1]
inappropriate for global monitoring of multi-domain networks.
Further, other works on intra-domain monitoring have not
provided solutions for the problem of candidate monitoring
path computation (e.g. [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]).
A. Candidate Monitoring Path Computation in Multi-domain
networks
The solution that we propose to compute candidate
monitoring paths consists in assigning a positive weight to
each network link, and exploring the network links with
a probability that is proportional to their weights. The
underlying idea is to reduce the probability to re-explore
bad sequences of links, while increasing the probability to
cross inter-domain links. Initially, all the links have an equal
weight. This means that links have the same probability to
be added to the computed path. The computation ends when
the path reaches the target node, this is a good path, or when
it reaches a node whose neighboring nodes already belong to
the path, this is a bad path. If the computed path is good,
the weights of all its links are incremented. Since all the
good paths cross inter-domain links, this will increase the
probability to use those links. We resume the computation
of new paths from the starting node, in order to increase the
space of explored paths.
B. Greedy Monitor Location and Path Selection Algorithm
Here, we give an outline of Algorithm 1. The algorithm
starts by selecting two monitor locations that have the lowest
costs; or in case several couple of monitor locations have the
lowest cost, it selects a couple arbitrary. Next, it computes a
set of candidate paths between the selected monitor locations
Algorithm 1
1: SP = ;
2: Select two monitor locations m1;m2 that have the lowest
monitor locations costs
3: Add m1 and m2 to SM
4: CP  fcandidate paths between m1 and m2g
5: 8pi 2 CP;DRi(SP )  (# of links covered by pi) /
(number of links of pi that are covered by paths in SP )
6: while ( not all links are covered ) do
7: find ps 2 CP=8pi 2 CP;DRs(SP )  DRi(SP )
8: if (DRs(SP ) == 0 ) then
9: Go to line 25
/* the deployed monitors cannot cover all the network
links*/
10: else
11: add ps to SP
12: remove ps from CP
13: update DRi(SP ), 8pi 2 CP
14: end if
15: end while
16: if ( Not all links are covered ) then
17: Go to line 25
18: else
19: if (the cost of deploying a new monitors  redundant
measurements incurred by paths in SP ) then
20: End of the algorithm
21: else
22: Go to line 25
23: end if
24: end if
25: Select a new monitor that minimize the monitor location
cost
26: Add the new monitor to SM
27: Clear CP
28: CP  candidate paths between the new monitor and the
deployed monitors
29: Remove paths that incur redundant measurements from SP
and add them to CP
30: Go to line 5
as described above. For each candidate path, the algorithm
computes a detection ratio that expresses the ratio between
the number of links that are covered by the path and the
number of redundant measurements, i.e. the number of links
that belong to the path and that are already covered by selected
monitoring paths, i.e. paths in SP . The path that have the
highest detection ratio is selected. This is because it achieves
the best trade-off between the number of covered links and
the number of redundant measurements. The detection ratios
are updated whenever a new path is selected.
Monitoring paths are selected until all the network links
are covered, or all the candidate paths have their detection
ratios equal to zero. In the latter case, the deployed monitors
are not sufficient to cover all the network links, therefore,
a new monitor is deployed. In the first case we get a full
monitoring solution, i.e. full coverage of the network links.
However, as said earlier, we want to find the best trade-off
between the monitor location cost and the anomaly detection
cost. Therefore, when the algorithm gets a full solution, it
verifies whether it can diminish the anomaly detection cost by
deploying new monitors. It decides to deploy a new monitor if
the cost of the new monitor is lower than the anomaly detection
cost of the solution computed over the previous iteration.
Now, when a new monitor is deployed, the algorithm
removes all the paths that incur redundant measurements from
the set of selected paths and inject them into the set of
candidate paths CP , and then updates the detection ratios and
selects monitoring paths with respect to their detection ratios.
V. EVALUATION
In this section we first describe the evaluation methodology,
and then we present and discuss numerical results.
A. Evaluation Methodology
The aim of the evaluation is to assess the performance
of per-domain monitoring versus global monitoring of
multi-domain networks. To this end, we run the heuristic
proposed in the previous section for these two monitoring
techniques on several multi-domain network topologies
generated randomly using the network generator Brite
(Waxman model:  =  = 0:4, random node placement)
[14]. Unless mentioned, we consider the following setting to
generate multi-domain topologies: the network is composed
of 3 domains; a domain of 10 nodes and 31 links is connected
to a domain of 15 nodes and 59 links, which is in turn
connected to a domain of 10 nodes and 31 links. The number
of border nodes that connect each domain to a neighboring
domain ranges from 2 to 3 nodes, and the number of
inter-domain links between two neighboring domains ranges
from 4 to 6 links. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to
this setting as the default setting. Fig. 5. depicts a sample
multi-domain topology. We assume that all the network nodes
are candidate to hold monitoring devices and that the cost
of deploying monitors is the same for all the nodes; i.e.
Cni = 1; 8ni 2 Ni 8i = 1; 2; :::;M . Furthermore, we assume
that the link monitoring cost is the same for all the network
links; i.e. Cli = 1; 8li 2 Li 8i = 1; 2; :::;M . We assume
that  =  = 1. All simulation measures are the mean
over 30 simulations on randomly generated topologies. Our
simulation plateform is developed in C++
For global monitoring, we assume that the central NOC,
which has a global knowledge of the multi-domain topology,
runs the heuristic on the global topology including the 3
domains and the inter-domain links connecting them. For per-
domain monitoring, each domain runs the heuristic on its intra-
domain topology. Once all the intra-domain links are covered,
neighboring domains exchange their set of border nodes that
hold monitoring devices, if any, in order to cover the inter-
domain links connecting them using the same heuristic on
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Fig. 5. Illustrative multi-domain topology
the inter-domain topology. We note that in our simulations,
if two intra-domain solutions have the same monitoring cost,
we choose the solution that deploys the most monitors on its
border nodes so that they can be re-used to cover inter-domain
links.
B. Numerical Results
We evaluate and compare the global monitoring technique
and the per-domain monitoring technique along four metrics:
1) Monitoring Cost: we expect that the fewer are the inter-
domain links, the smaller is the difference between the costs of
the solutions delivered by global monitoring and the solutions
delivered by per-domain monitoring. Indeed, global monitor-
ing reduces the monitoring cost by monitoring inter-domain
paths, i.e. paths that cross multiple domains. This is because
the monitoring of inter-domain paths requires less monitoring
devices and can cover links of crossed domains and also
inter-domain links. However, the number of non-overlapping
inter-domain monitoring paths is proportional to the number
of inter-domain links. Therefore, the global monitoring opti-
mization gets blocked by redundant measurements of inter-
domain links, and ends by deploying additional monitors to
avoid overlaps among inter-domain paths.
To validate our expectations, we run the heuristics for global
and per-domain monitoring on topologies with the default
setting, and also on topologies for which we doubled the
number of inter-domain links. Fig. 6. plots the monitoring
cost, i.e. the number of deployed monitors and the number
of redundant measurements of links, for the two monitoring
techniques applied on topologies with the default setting. Fig
7 plots the same metrics for the two monitoring techniques
applied on topologies for which we have doubled the number
of inter-domain links.
As expected, Fig. 6. shows that the difference between
the monitoring costs of the solutions delivered by the two
monitoring techniques is low for the default setting. We notice
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Fig. 7. Monitoring Cost: doubling inter-domain links
also that the global monitoring technique deploys few mon-
itors than the per-domain monitoring technique, whereas the
number of redundant measurements is slightly larger for global
monitoring. Fig. 7. shows that, compared to the results for the
default setting, the global monitoring technique deploys less
monitors and achieves almost the same number of redundant
measurements. In contrast, the cost of the solutions delivered
by the per-domain monitoring technique has almost doubled.
Clearly, the per-domain monitoring techniques needs to deploy
additional monitors to cover the high number of inter-domain
links.
We note that practically the number of inter-domain con-
nections is generally small in usual networks, and thus, the
default setting is more realistic [9].
2) Computation Time: Fig. 8. draws the average CPU
computation time for global and per-domain monitoring. The
figure shows that per-domain monitoring is much more faster
than global monitoring. As explained earlier, this is because
it takes longer time to compute candidate monitoring paths
that cross multiple domains than to compute intra-domain
candidate monitoring paths. However, the heuristic succeeds
to deliver a solution for global monitoring in about 1200
seconds, whereas other heuristics devised for mono-domain
networks have stumbled against the topology properties of
multi-domain networks.
3) Quality of monitored paths: We categorize the moni-
toring paths according to their lengths, in terms of number
of links, into five groups: paths of length in [1-5], paths of
length in [6-10], paths of length in [11-15], paths of length in
[16-20], and paths of length in [21-30]. In Fig. 9., we show
the distribution of network links by path length groups for the
two monitoring techniques. A link belongs to a path length
group if it is monitored by a path whose length is included in
the length range of that group.
First, we notice that the longest monitoring paths for the per-
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Fig. 9. Distribution of network links by path length groups
domain monitoring technique are of length less than or equal
to 15 links; whereas for the global monitoring technique, the
length of monitoring paths reaches 30 links. This is because
the global monitoring technique monitors inter-domain paths
that are naturally longer than intra-domain paths. Second, Fig.
9. shows that more than 40% of network links belong to long
paths, paths whose length is more than or equal to 15. This
means that in 40% of cases of link-level anomalies, we get
between 15 and 30 suspect links. In contrast, for per-domain
monitoring almost 90% of network links belong to short paths,
paths whose length is less than or equal to 10. We conclude
that per-domain monitoring technique reduces the length of
monitoring paths, and therefore, reduces anomaly detection
delays and the number of suspect links when an anomaly
occurs.
4) Fairness of monitoring solutions: In this section we
propose to show the distribution of monitors and redundant
measurements across domains. The aim is to evaluate the
fairness of the monitoring solutions delivered by the two
monitoring techniques in distributing the monitoring load
among domains. To this end, we consider in our simulations
multi-domain networks composed of 4 domains having the
same number of intra-domain links, 18 links, and the same
number of nodes, 8 nodes. Each of the 4 domains is connected
to 2 other domains. The number of inter-domain connections,
i.e. number of inter-domain links and inter-domain nodes
connecting two neighboring domains, is the same for each
couple of neighboring domains. For such symmetric multi-
domain networks, a fair monitoring solution would distribute
monitors and redundant measurements among domains evenly.
We use the Gini coefficient to measure the efficiency of
monitoring cost balancing among domains [12] [13]. Fig. 10.
plots the Lorenz curves for the two monitoring techniques.
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Fig. 10. Distribution of monitors and redundant measurements across
domains
Here, the curves are functions of the cumulative percentage
of the number of domains ordered by their monitoring cost, i.e.
the number of monitors located in the domain and the number
of redundant measurements of the domain links, on the x-
axis mapped onto the corresponding cumulative percentage of
their monitoring costs on the y-axis. We note that if an inter-
domain link is measured multiple times, we add the cost of
this redundant measurement to the monitoring costs of the
two domains it connects. If the monitoring cost is distributed
among domains evenly, the Lorenz curve is a diagonal line
that we call the line of equality. Uneven distributions generate
curves below this line. The larger is the area between the line
of equality and the Lorenz curve, the greater is the inequality
in the distribution of monitoring load among domains.
Fig. 10. shows that the curve corresponding to the global
monitoring technique falls below the curve corresponding
to the per-domain technique. This means that per-domain
technique balances the monitoring load among domains more
efficiently. This is explained by the fact that, in contrast to
the per-domain monitoring technique, the global monitoring
technique considers the multi-domain networks as a single
domain. This generates uneven distributions of the monitoring
load among domains.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of monitor
location and anomaly detection in multi-domain networks. An
ILP formulation was proposed; and a heuristic that takes into
account the the limitations of multi-domain topologies and
the requirements of multi-domain monitoring was devised.
This heuristic is used to evaluate and compare two multi-
domain monitoring techniques, global monitoring and per-
domain monitoring, with respect to a set of performance met-
rics that emerge from the properties of multi-domain networks.
Simulation results show that confidentiality is so far not the
only constraint to global monitoring, and demonstrate that per-
domain monitoring is an efficient alternative. In our future
works, we will investigate the problem of anomaly localization
in mono-domain and multi-domain networks.
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